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Conciliation, Corruption, and Convulsion in Dominican Politics Black Research Professor Public
Administration University of New Mexico Imagine the president of a poor country throwing a
Christmas party and inviting all the little urchins to the presidential palace to receive gifts and
then placing the military and the police in charge of distribution. That is precisely what Dominican
President Joaquin Balaguer did, though as in most Latin American countries, the Three Kings
(rather than Santa Claus) arrive laden with gifts on January 8. The outcome was predictable: hoards
of raggedy children storming the palace gates, pushing and shoving and climbing over and through
the fence, only to be thrown back again by machine gun-toting guards. If security was the purpose
of the military presence, it was not very effective. Without even claiming to be a member of the
press, I glided through every checkpoint, merely asking if it were the press entrance. If order or
efficiency were intended, they were also missed by a long shot. And in the course of the long ordeal,
there were surely more children terrorized than thrilled. The gifts were varied and quite substantial,
but even those who finally received one a bicycle, for example, a large truck or race car, a doll, or
a tea set generally emerged crying or screaming rather than laughing. Was Balaguer's reputation
besmirched by such a fiasco? Not at all. After a year and a half in office this time around, his teflon
remained unscratched that is, until the outbreak of the 1988 spring riots. By all accounts, his enviable
position derived in large measure from his genius for political bargaining and conciliation. Balaguer
also profited, ironically, from his failure to establish a real party or any other civilian institution of
consequence. No one seemed to begrudge his solitary style of decision-making; and even his wouldbe enemies wished him good health, largely because of the uncertainties that would accompany
his demise. No new generation of leaders is apparent in Balaguer's Social Christian Reformist
Party (PRSC), or in any other party. In fact, the cast of characters in Dominican politics has been
remarkably stable for more than two dozen years. The country's two octogenerian political figures
Juan Bosch and Balaguer have had their ups and downs and fierce clashes with each other over
the years since Balaguer inherited the military-based political machinery of the fearsome dictator
Trujillo, and Bosch took on the old guard at the head of the country's first middle- and workingclass party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, Dominican
politics remains a pas de deux and, in the late 1980s, it seems an almost graceful one. Balaguer's
appointments in this the first of his five presidential terms that he clearly holds by popular choice,
are a veritable Who's Who of the Center to Right, including many of his one-time enemies. The
aristocracy, which has not always been on good terms with Balaguer, is represented by Donald
Reid Cabral, who headed the very conservative "triumvirate" government of 1963-65; Reid Cabral
is serving as minister of foreign affairs. Foreign investors might be reassured by the placement of
Carlos A. Morales Troncoso in the vice-presidency. Morales Troncoso, previously a local manager
of Gulf and Western properties had become a major stockholder in the properties of the Fanjul
brothers, who bought out Gulf and Western in early 1985. The Christian Democrats, whose recent
merger with Balaguer's Reformist Party provided Balaguer with valuable international ties and
legitimacy, have not yet reaped much from the bargain. Their leaders still believe that one day
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they stand to inherit Balaguer's base in the peasantry. In the meantime, however, Balaguer has
used them mainly to fill subcabinet positions where it is important to have competent people who
can be counted upon not to steal. Balaguer's choice for secretary of the armed forces was sure
to displease some of the military's career officers, but might be reassuring to the Pentagon and
the CIA. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera is one of two survivors from among those who, in 1961, at
the behest of the CIA, assassinated Trujillo. The interior secretary, in charge of the police and of
"public order," is the omnipresent Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. Wessin masterminded the coup
against the government of Juan Bosch in 1963 and, with the help of the US Marines, put down the
uprising of Bosch's Constitutionalist forces in 1965. He also conspired a time or two in the early
1970s against the government of Balaguer. Some speculated that Balaguer had drawn Imbert and
Wessin into his cainbet in order, figuratively (he is almost blind), to keep an eye on them. It was
clear that confidence between the president and these officers was less than complete. In late 1987
Balaguer vetoed and pushed into early reitrement Imbert's nominees for chiefs of the three armed
services. At any rate, the military leaders in the cabinet are essentially "gastado," or burned out,
having little following of their own. This leaves Balaguer free to mediate among services and factions
whose loyalty is to him above all others. The PRD, abandoned by Bosch in 1973, had finally returned
to power in 1978, but was defeated in 1986 by Balaguer's PRSC. The PRD remains profoundly
discredited by the economic failures and much heralded corruption of the Jorge Blanco government.
It is also irreparably split between the factions of Jacobo Majluta and Jose Francisco Pena Gomez.
Majluta, generally viewed as an able but corrupt politician, is believed to have a firmer grip on
party "machinery," particularly in the provinces. But Pena Gomez's popular base among the poor
in the nation's capital, Santo Domingo, probably give him better long term prospects of reviving the
party. The Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), which Bosch established in 1973 as his new political
vehicle, has gained followers at the expense of the sinking PRD and may have benefited as well
from Balaguer's relatively benign attitude toward it. Both Bosch and Balaguer have reserved their
harshest criticisms for the PRD. The two grand old men of contemporary Dominican history both
scholars as well as politicians have long been known to hold a certain respect for each other, and on
various occasions since Balaguer's return to the presidency there has appeared to be an unspoken
accord between them. The PLD is generally acknowledged to be the best organized party in the
country at present. It claimed 18% of the vote in the last election and has been growing very fast
since then. It would not be surprising if Bosch, still physically and mentally robust, were reelected
to the presidency in 1990. The question then would be whether or not the US and Dominican
armed forces would allow him to take office. The answer to that one may have more to do with
developments in the US than in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer's approach to the country's very
severe economic problems printing pesos to cover a new public works program, and more recently
to stimulate agricultural production has generated new jobs but has also resulted in devaluation
and accelerated inflation (officially at about 30%, but seemingly much higher). Meanwhile, foreign
reserves deriving first from remittances from Dominican emigrants, second from tourism, and to
an unknown degree from the drug trade, cannot be expected to adequately service a foreign debt
of some $4 billion. A new class of financiers has learned how to profit from the country's economic
prostration through currency exchange deals and speculation in scarce commodities. This group
competes for influence with another new rich sector, the narcotraficantes, some of whom are plying
their trade in the Dominican Republic, while others are merely laundering money earned elsewhere.
Given the country's dire economic straits, and particularly a steady decline over several years in the
standard of living of the poor majority, the ambience that prevailed until early 1988 was remarkably
calm and stable. There had been few manifestations of civil unrest. A general strike in July 1987
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generated no disorder (due in part to the curiously passive role played by PLD-dominated student
and labor groups), and police did not fire a single shot a restraint duly noticed and publicly praised
by human rights monitors. The record of the new born-again-democratic Balaguer in this regard
stands in stark contrast to that of previous Balaguer governments as well as to the government of
Jorge Blanco. (The slow moving machinery of the UN Human Rights Commission in late 1987 ruled
in favor of reparations for those brutalized by the Jorge Blanco government's tactics in the course of
the 1984 riots.) The current government's record on human rights even before the convulsions early
this year was not without blemish. 1987 witnessed a nasty sequence of events involving two young
Dominicans of Haitian ancestry who attempted to help secure some rights for Haitian workers at
a batey (sugar plantation) near the border. The murder of one of the men, which occurred when
army troops with machine guns blasting broke up a meeting at the batey, was witnessed by the
other. Army officers of the frontier battalion, commanded by one of the sons of Defense Minister
Imbert Barrera, alleged that the young man had been killed by his colleague. The colleague was
jailed to await trial, even after the bullet found in a second autopsy was traced to the army. A few
days later, after interrogation, the man was reported to have committed suicide. Balaguer indicated
to a human rights monitor who solicited his intervention, that he understood the situation but
was not in a position to do anything about it. Haitians in the Dominican Republic remain highly
vulnerable to scapegoating or worse, but until 1988 even Balaguer's political enemies conceded that
relatively speaking this government had shown sensitivity to human rights concerns and restraint
in maintaining order. In fact, the Balaguer government had shown such skill in conciliation that
instead of the polarization that might have been expected amidst economic desperation, the political
scene as 1988 began was more aptly being characterized as a "sancocho," or stew. To a very large
extent, the measure of Balaguer's durability and, by extension, that of any Dominican president
hinges on his approach to corruption. In fact, the fortunes of Dominican presidents since the fall of
Trujillo reveal a great deal about the role of corruption in Dominican politics and about Dominican
attitudes toward corruption. Bosch was overthrown in part because he tried to pull the plug on
military corruption. The coup of 1963 that so abbreviated his presidency had many authors, not the
least of which, according to Bosch himself and to his friends and enemies alike, were agents and
agencies of the US government. But the Dominican armed forces had their own motives, which went
well beyond the publicly paraded ones of maintaining order and fighting communism. According to
a retired army offier who had been among those selected by their peers to deliver to the president
a briefing on military grievances, Bosch's insistence on curtailing US arms purchases threatened to
put an and to some of the armed forces' most lucrative rackets (resale, cuts for purchasing agents,
etc.). Jorge Blanco, currently in the United States for an indefinite period of "medical observation,"
is in disrepute and in fact under indictment because he allegedly tried to take over and orchestrate
military and other rackets. Widely accredited charges against him range from the massive allocation
to friends and political cronies of tax exemptions for the importation of cars and industrial products
to conspiracy in currency exchange and narcotrafico. Moreover, it is widely rumored that several
million dollars allotted annually to "national security" simply disappeared. His highest-ranking
military and police appointees are also under indictment, largely as a consequence of denunciations
originating from within the military. It appears, then, that career military officers feel strongly
about the right of the institution to run its own rackets without interference or competition from
civilian authorities. As before, Balaguer is being careful not to impede institutional (as opposed to
PRD-based) military rackets. He found during previous presidential terms that most officers were
willing to surrender considerable political power and to address total loyalty to him in exchange
for the opportunity to enrich themselves at the public's expense. A particularly well connected
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political insider maintains that in the 1980s the three services have become highly specialized in
their profit-making endeavors. The Air Force, he says, has the narcotrafico protection franchise.
The Navy has the concession for protecting illegal exit to Puerto Rico. Army enterprises are rather
more diverisified, but on the Haitian frontier the Army monopolizes the taking of bribes from
Haitians entering illegally and the confiscation of their purchases as they leave. The police are
left with the generally less lucrative "mordidas" they can extract from traffic offenders and street
operators. Balaguer, meanwhile, maintains an ascetic life-style and is universally acclaimed for
his "personal" integrity. Even Bosch and other political opponents give full credence to Balaguer's
assertion that the corruption stops at the door to his office. It is not entirely clear that Balaguer wants
to bring Jorge Blanco back to the island to stand trial on the mounting charges. From both Right
and Left have come muted public complaints that having raised public anger to a frenzy over the
crimes of the PRD government, Balaguer now appears to be backing away from his commitment
to prosecute. It could be that he fears that testimony might spill over into matters not directly
attributable to the previous administration. But as Ambassador Guido D'Alessandro, serving for
the second time in a Balaguer government, says of the enigmatic president, "Anybody who says
he understands Balaguer's plans or motivations is lying." At any rate, the climate that so recently
prevailed, in which all of the country's ills were blamed on his runaway predecessor, was serving
Balaguer very well indeed. That climate changed suddenly and dramatically during the third week
of February. The protests that began at that time, over low wages, the soaring costs of basic goods
and services, and the scarcity of such amenities as electricity and potable water, were remarkably
widespread. At least eleven of the country's 27 provinces were crippled by general strikes, and
incidents of violence were reported throughout the country, particularly in Santo Domingo, and in
a half dozen northern cities. By March 2, casualties included at least six dead and 20 wounded, and
hundreds of protesters had been arrested. Along with the use of military force to crush the unrest,
Balaguer's offer of a substantial wage hike to public employees on March 1 may have contributed
to a lull later in the month. But violence erupted once again April 6, as thousands took part in street
demonstrations throughout the country. Bombs exploded in Santo Domingo and in Santiago, the
country's second-largest city. Twenty persons were injured in the bombing in Santiago, and many
more were reportedly injured in Santo Domingo in confrontations with riot squad police. A National
Strike and Struggle Committee (Conalucha), comprised largely of neighborhood associations,
peasant groups, religious base communities, and a variety of civic and political organizations,
called for a 48-hour nationwide general strike to begin on April 7. Negotiations between labor and
business leaders mediated by the Catholic hierarchy may serve to quell the unrest for the short
term. But Balaguer is now on notice that the bargaining and conciliation that have served in the past
to mitigate conflict among elites are no substitute for addressing the urgent needs of the masses.
And the crisis of deprivation is now his own.

-- End --
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